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'Selling off New Zealand' 
... and claiming it back 
JANE KELSEY Is EL LING OFF NEW ZEALAND' implies a sense of 
finality and irreversibility which I am determined 
to resist. It becomes too tempting simply to catalogue and 
bemoan the events of the past decade, and the betrayal of 
those who, despite their promises, continue to sell the 
country's heritage to the highest bidder. That kind of 
response is not enough any more. We know what has 
happened, how it was done, what the effects have been 
for rich and poor. The challenge now is to move forward 
and work out how to reclaim some greater degree of 
control over the resources, decisions, language and val-
ues that shape our lives. 
That requires, to quote a popular maxim from 
Gramsci, 'pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the 
will'. It means being realistic and recognising that some 
things have indeed changed irreversibly. Some of the 
power and resources that have been transferred to pri-
vate and foreign hands cannot be retrieved. The Keynesian 
welfare state cannot be rebuilt, even if we wanted it back. 
Nor can we turn our backs on global reality and on our 
changing place in the world. Our perceptions of such 
relationships have changed. It sounds trite these days to 
observe that the locus of power has become even more 
diffused, with greater limitations on what the nation-state 
can do. Yet, as that perception becomes more widely un-
derstood there is also the danger of it being overplayed. 
We need to maintain a healthy scepticism about claims 
that transnational capital, international institutions and 
agencies control our lives and there is nothing we can do. 
The past 12 years have dramatically altered the con-
crete realities of our daily lives and our consciousness of 
the world. For some- I suspect many- it has fostered an 
unhealthy introspection, and the kind of insecurity that 
encourages xenophobia and racism. In the later 1980s, the 
resurgence of Maori claims over resources and political 
power was met with assertions of Pakeha nationalism and 
the unity of the (colonial) nation state. The mid-1990s saw 
a renewed backlash against 'political correctness' and 
Maori nationalism, this time accompanied by anti-Asian 
racism- reflecting, I suspect, the fear of Pakeha that they 
too are losing control of their lives to faceless, self-interested, 
and mainly alien, individuals and enterprises. 
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Ironically, beneath that seemingly unbridgeable antago-
nism lay a unifying theme. Maori nationalists have increas-
ingly focused their analysis and strategies on the interna-
tional arena. For over a decade they have attacked the 
government's refusal to support indigenous self-determina-
tion at the meetings on the Draft Declaration on Indigenous 
Peoples in Geneva, and more recently its record on the 
treatment of young Maori before the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Rights of the Child. They are helping to lead 
the indigenous campaign against global trade treaties, such 
as the intellectual property provisions (TRIPS) of the GATT. 
They have warned foreign investors of the risks of not 
seeking approval from tangata whenua, and campaigned 
against privatisations on the land and in the courts . Many 
Tauiwi share these concerns in relation to themselves, but 
cannot get past the legacy of racism and supremacism 
which paints Maori as the enemy. This paradox was en-
capsulated in the appeal which the anti-foreign invest-
ment, anti-immigration and anti-privatisation policies of 
(the opportunistically-named) New Zealand First held 
for both Maori and Pakeha, who together helped the party 
secure the political balance of power in the 1996 election. 
The concerns that many share go beyond what might 
be dismissed as instinctive or popular nationalism. In 
1995, farmers, media, Maori, conservationists and other 
rather unlikely allies joined forces to resist attempts to 
loosen foreign investment laws relating to land and im-
pose greater secrecy on the application process. The issue 
has permeated academia too. Otago University's Foreign 
Policy School chose the topic of 'State and Sovereignty: is 
the State in retreat?' for its 1996 programme, with con-
tributors reflecting divergent voices and views. Even 
Reserve Bank Governor Don Brash recently felt impelled 
to deliver reassuring speeches entitled 'Foreign Invest-
ment in New Zealand: Does it threaten our prosperity or 
our sovereignty?' ' and 'New Zealand and International Fi-
nancial Markets: Have we lost control of our own destiny?''. 
DEFINING SOVEREIGNTY 
These diverse, often divergent, actions, statements and 
sentiments tend to converge around the meta-narrative of 
'sovereignty' -a term easily invoked, but rarely defined 
and full of contradiction. The formal legal definition, ac-
cording to Black's Law Dictionary, is: 
The supreme, absolute and uncontrollable power by which 
any independent state is governed; supreme political au-
thority; the supreme will; paramount control of the constitu-
tion and frame of government and its administration; the 
self-sufficient source of political power, from which all spe-
cific political powers are derived; the international inde-
pendence of a state, combined with the right and power of 
regulating its internal affairs without foreign dictation; also a 
political society, or state, which is sovereign and independent. 
On that definition, this country has not experienced 
true sovereignty since the Crown usurped the (shared and 
contested) power of genuinely sovereign Iwi and Hapu in 
1840. But the fiction of sovereignty is nevertheless real in its 
effect. So long as it is broadly accepted, or ineffectively 
challenged, it in practice legitimates the system of govern-
ment and law through which economic, social and human 
relations have historically been regulated, and through which 
coercive power is exercised. When that fiction is exposed, 
the legitimacy of the state's power is at risk of being under-
mined. So the meta-narrative of sovereignty is staunchly 
maintained in the face of the leverage exercised by the inter-
national financial institutions, the binding nature of 
multilateral trade agreements, the de facto political power 
exercised by finance capital and transnational enterprise, 
and the glaring inequality between rich and poor states. 
Whether maintaining the fiction is good or bad must 
be left for another time. What I want to explore further 
today is the extent to which the New Zealand state has 
lost its ability to exercise 'supreme' control. In doing so I 
want to distinguish between formal legal sovereignty of 
the kind Black defines and state autonomy, which David 
Held has defined as 'the state's actual capacity to act 
independently in the articulations and pursuit of domes-
tic and international policy objectives'.' 
In a formal sense, there has been relatively little dimi-
nution of legal sovereignty. Perhaps the most significant 
constraints are the commitments in relation to the global 
economy under the Closer Economic Relations (CER) trade 
agreement with Australia, and the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT, both of which tie the hands of future governments 
in relation to border protection, intellectual property, serv-
ices and investment measures under threat of economic 
sanctions for breach. As the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) moves to extend the already-expanded agenda of 
the GATT to areas like information technology, foreign 
investment and environment, its significance, and the cor-
responding erosion of legal sovereignty, will continue to 
grow. Technically, however, a government can still refuse 
to comply with the rulings of a WTO dispute panel or 
ultimately withdraw from the agreement altogether. 
We would expect, however, that there would be se-
vere economic and political consequences for refusal to 
comply with such commitments. This suggests that it is 
the autonomy of the state in practice to make policy and 
law which has been more dramatically undermined. That, 
in turn, raises the question of how real those consequences 
need to be, or whether it is enough that they exist as 
constraints in our minds. 
CONSOLIDATING THE PRIVATISATION OF POWER 
The New Zealand 'revolution' was intended progressively 
to shift the locus of economic, and consequently social, 
employment, environmental and cultural, decision-mak-
ing permanently from public to private control. This 
privatisation of power is often said to be permanent and 
irreversible. I want to argue that we have been encour-
aged to believe this, but it is not necessarily so. 
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Convincing those who exercise power to accept the 
new parameters as given, and propose only changes within 
that paradigm is a strategic goal of the structural adjust-
ment process. In a study published in 1992 Stephen 
Haggard and Robert Kaufman identified two stages- the 
initiation and the consolidation of structural change -with 
significant differences in the political logic of each. The 
initiation phase, they suggest, is best secured through 
relatively autonomous, free-floating, technocratic 'change 
teams', and requires a more activist and capable state 
than classical liberal theory contemplates; paradoxically, 
the state needs to be strengthened before the government 
can reduce its role in the economy and extend market 
forces . This means creating new bureaucratic structures 
or significantly reorganising existing ones to operate out-
side routine decision-making channels. The authors 
conclude that 'reform initiatives are more likely where 
and when political institutions insulate politicians and 
their technocratic allies from particular interest group 
constraints, at least in the short run' .• 
Some, like John Williamson from the Institute for 
International Economics in Washington, believe that con-
solidation follows naturally from the successful initiation 
of change. Initiation requires strong leadership, uncon-
strained by the need for social consensus - reflecting the 
oft-expressed view that people cannot appreciate what is 
good for them until it is done. Once those changes have 
been made, social consensus and ideological convergence 
should inevitably emerge. 
Others believe that consolidation requires considerably 
more sophistication, skill and engagement with social real-
ity. Haggard and Kaufman point to the importance of: 
stabilising expectations around a new set of incentives and 
convincing economic agents that they cannot be reversed at 
the discretion of individual decision makers. Consolidation 
is most likely where governments have constructed rela-
tively stable coalitions of political support that encompass 
major private sector beneficiaries, and have secured at least 
the acquiescence of the major political forces competing within 
the political system. Without such tacit or explicit alliances be-
tween politicians, technocratic elites, and those gaining from the 
policy change, reform attempts will necessarily falter. 5 
Alongside this comes a wider need for 'social learn-
ing', which they describe as the: 
evolution of a broader ideational consensus among lead-
ers, interest groups, party elites and attentive publics that 
sets some boundaries on the range of economic debate. 
Such a consensus does not imply stasis or the absence of 
conflict; distributive struggles will always arise over policy. 
Nonetheless, it is possible that the long-term sustainability 
of policy choices will depend on a convergence of think-
ing about fundamental means-ends relationships in the 
economy. If so, then the formation of elite preferences, 
ideas, and ideology, as well as the evolution of public 
opinion, are potential important explanatory variables' 
Beyond this consensus of the elite, a broader adjust-
ment of popular expectations is also required whereby 
the wider populace believe 'there is no alternative' . 
Citizens and firms are encouraged to lower their expecta-
tions and make individual, non-political adjustments, such 
as sending more family members into the work force, 
entering into informal sector activities and reducing con-
sumption. Even if their demands for relief become 
politicised, they are more likely to be directed at the gov-
ernment in power than at the system as a whole.' This 
does not require a high degree of popular support for the 
new regime. Joan Nelson suggests that a 'durable grum-
bling acquiescence' is enough, although achieving even 
that requires positive effort.' 
In New Zealand the consolidation phase is well 
advanced and, despite a new electoral system and a new 
government, very little seems likely to change. The Na-
tional/New Zealand First coalition agreement is 
committed to 'implementing orthodox economic policies 
in line with or better than the best international practice'. 
Particularly ominous are proposed reviews on key areas 
of 'unfinished business', such as the employment courts 
and employment-related laws, the minimum wage, pro-
ducer boards and universities. Meanwhile privatisations 
continue at central and local government level, irrespec-
tive of electoral mandate. 
The naive who believed that an ·MMP electoral sys-
tem would produce a more accountable, responsive and 
representative government overnight, and soften or re-
verse the changes of the past 12 years, feel betrayed. But 
they should not have been surprised . The key elements of 
the structural adjustment programme- sale of state assets 
and operations, the deep infiltration of foreign capital, 
the binding commitments to freer trade under the GATT/ 
WTO, dismantling the institutional structures of the wel-
fare state, and dispersing former government functions, 
powers and funds across a wide range of public, quasi-
autonomous and private agencies - were designed to 
outlast a shift in political power. Most parties and politi-
cians have come to consider the verdict of the market to 
be as important, if not more important, than that of the 
electorate, and have tailored their policies accordingly -
Michael Laws performed that role for New Zealand First 
in the months preceding the election. A significant ideo-
logical and cultural shift has also taken place. For the 
beneficiaries of restructuring and the generation of 'chil-
dren of the market', the neo-liberal paradigm is now the 
norm and what used to be called the 'left' seems depress-
ingly devoid of credible alternatives. 
Moving out of this paradigm will not be easy. It is 
supported by new techniques and discourses of governance 
centred around economic science, managerialism and con-
tract law. The centralised bureaucratic state has been replaced 
by a market-driven regime where the self-maximising indi-
vidual transacts under the regulatory umbrella of contract 
law. The theoretical justifications provided by public choice, 
agency, transaction cost economics and new public manage-
ment seek to control behaviours, circumscribe options 
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and exclude participants and ideas. Fundamental changes 
- how we regulate markets, control inflation, order la-
bour relations, deliver education, health or housing, levy 
taxes, provide policy advice or ensure accountability -
are conveyed as shifts of technique. Previously contest-
able arenas of constitutional law, political philosophy and 
administrative theory give way to the one-dimensional 
quasi-scientism of economic and managerial theory. 'Re-
structuring' or 'structural adjustment' is portrayed as 
instrumental, devoid of culture, context or power. 
This has erected an intellectual barrier which seeks to 
insulate the change agents and guardians of the new regime 
from critique and constrain any debate on alternatives to 
variations within the theme. 'Credible' debate about op-
tions is confined within their paradigm. Social structure 
is acknowledged only so far as it can be logically reduced 
to the rational self-interest or (ir)responsibility of indi-
viduals . Maori can participate in policy debate provided 
they accept the primacy of the atomised, self-interested 
individual, the commodification of nature, knowledge and 
human endeavour, and the property rights created under 
colonial law. Women, too, can engage- on condition that 
the paradox of the self-maximising 'market man' and al-
truistic, hence irrational, 'family woman' on which the 
market model depends remains unexplored. 
The voices of the market have systematically por-
trayed this new template as international orthodoxy to 
which there is no alternative. Reflecting on the neo-liberal 
model, British theorist John Toye explains that: 
no one feels the need to test it empirically because the facts 
are too obvious; no one really wants to delve into welfare 
economics because its results are vulnerable to a whole raft 
of academic quibbles; and no one is really going to call in the 
Spanish Inquisition if the occasional economics harbours 
sincere doubts about, say, the privatization proposition. We 
are ... in the realm of the Empowering Myth.' 
He observes how this process of 'consensus-mongering' 
conflates: 
what economists believe with what is economic truth . We 
ought to question what other people believe, not believe it 
because they believe it. That, at least, is how we got where 
we are now. Truth is always provisional, and it is the 
product of criticism just as much as the attempt to pro-
mote 'economic correctness'. 10 
The fetish with the economically correct seeks to freeze 
or concretise ideas. It loses sight of the fact that ideas are 
always in flux, always embedded in critical debate . The 
learning process disappears, so that people continue to 
believe there is no alternative and nothing they can do, 
even where it is clear that neo-liberalism has failed. 
I would suggest we are nearing that stage now. The 
cheer brigade claim that by getting the economic funda-
mentals right they have produced a stable, internationally 
competitive economy. In practice, their strategy has caused 
sharp peaks and troughs of economic activity, uncertainty 
and instability in the real economy, and deep insecurity 
among people who are forced to plan extensively (and 
expensively) for their future lives . Developments during 
1996 and early 1997 show how vulnerable the economy is 
to shifts in international markets, interest and exchange 
rates, and speculative forays of foreign capital. The bal-
ance of payments deficit and foreign debt burden are both 
threatening to blow out. The market-oriented social infra-
structure of health, education and housing, and core 
government agencies, face chronic systems failures . Job 
growth has fallen, as has labour productivity, with a mass 
of low-skilled workers engaged in low-quality, part-time 
and low-paid work. Poverty, inequality, and un- and un-
der-employment are predicted to increase once more. As 
market failures continue it should become difficult to 
argue for more of the same. There are windows of oppor-
tunity to rethink the 'fundamentals' for the first time in 12 
years. Yet we seem politically and intellectually paralysed. 
WHERE DOES THE POWER LIE? 
To move beyond that paralysis and open the windows to 
change we have to demolish the hold that TINA (there is 
no alternative) has over us. Two inter-related sets of ques-
tions need to be raised, the second of which is dependent 
on the first . Firstly, if we believe there is the possibility of 
change, what realistically we can do? Has New Zealand 
been irretrievably sold down the neo-liberal line? Can 
authority over at least part of those resources and deci-
sions be retrieved? If so how, by and for whom, at what 
cost? Secondly, given those constraints and those oppor-
tunities, what are the alternatives? 
Power which was primarily exercised within and be-
tween territorial states for at least the bulk of this century 
is now exercised through overlapping realms of economic 
and political space. In attempting to 'map' this John Ruggie 
has described the emergence of: 
a non territorial 'region' in the world economy- a decentred 
yet integrated space-of-flows, operating in real time, which 
exists alongside the spaces-of-places that we call national 
economies. These conventional spaces-of-places continue to 
engage in external economic relations with one another, 
which we continue to call trade, foreign investment and the 
like, and which are more or less effectively mediated by the 
state. In the non-territorial global economic regions, however, 
the conventional distinctions between internal and external once 
again are exceedingly problematic, and any given state is but 
one constraint in corporate global strategic calculationsu 
Ruggie's imagery allows us to map the dimension of 
transnational enterprise and capital flows onto geographi-
cally-configurated national economies. In New Zealand's 
case we are told the country's deep exposure to interna-
tional flows of capital means any significant change to 
Reserve Bank policy or re-regulation in areas like finance, 
industry, agriculture, employment or environment - in-
deed, even standing still - would have dire economic 
consequences. Specific threats include capital flight by 
international and local investors, credit rating downgrades 
and increased cost of debt, runs on the dollar, deep reces-
sion, loss of jobs, falling tax revenue, cuts to government 
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spending and services, and the relegation of New Zea-
land once more to the periphery. These claims need to be 
met with careful assessments of the benefits that various 
forms of foreign investment bring, the likely responses of 
each to changes in different areas of regulation, and the 
consequences of those responses, not in aggregate eco-
nomic terms, but in the relative distribution of costs and 
benefits across the social landscape. 
While Ruggie's 'multi-perspectival polity' is a useful 
start, it offers only a partial understanding of constraints 
on the state's autonomy. It makes no provision for those 
formal and informal, state and non-state sources of regu-
latory power which do not coincide with the territorial 
boundaries of the national economy, and hence the nation 
state. What I will call 'spaces-of-regulation' include fed-
erations of states (such as the EU), federal agreements 
(like NAFT A), international agreements between states 
(such as the GATT /WTO), informal agreements between 
'economies' (such as APEC). All of these seek, through 
various legal and persuasive techniques, to delimit what 
individual states can do. Complicating that further are 
the transborder administrative and legal jurisdictions (like 
the Transmanche Euroregion that links Kent, Calais and 
three parts of Belgium, or the Singapore-Johor-Riau Tri-
angle that integrates parts of Singapore, Malaysia and 
Indonsesia) which have begun to emerge. 
In New Zealand's case this 'space-of-regulation' cen-
tres around CER, the GATT / WTO and APEC. In some 
cases, such as the GATT and CER, potentially severe pen-
alties could result if we refused to comply, although the 
extend to which the costs may outweigh the benefits needs 
to be carefully assessed . Any future extension of those 
commitments will impose a further constraint on state 
autonomy - hence the increasing demands even from 
within government for open debate and intensive scru-
tiny of these agreements. At present such negotiations are 
shrouded in secrecy. 
In most countries expanding these spaces-of-regulation 
requires a mandate, or at least formal ratification by the 
domestic legislature. In New Zealand, Australia and the 
United Kingdom, however, international treaties and agree-
ments are designated 'acts of state' which require neither 
mandate nor ratification. Several years ago the Law Com-
mission expressed concern about this form of extra-territorial 
law-making.12 In October last year Clerk of the House David 
McGee echoed these views, calling the situation 'not just 
unsatisfactory' but 'unsupportable and 'anti-democratic'. 
Drawing on an Australian Senate report that proposed con-
sultation of their Parliament before any international treaty 
is ratified," McGee placed a similar proposal before the 
New Zealand's Standing Orders Committee for consid-
eration." The Ministry of Justice's 1996 post-election 
briefing paper has recommended greater public partici-
pation in treaty-making, formal approval in parliament 
before ratification, select committee oversight, and the 
publication of reports on the effects and values of treaties 
for New Zealanders. The proposed OECD multilateral agree-
menton investment, which is intended ultimately to remove 
virtually all restrictions on foreign investment, is fuelling 
demands to change the way these decisions are made. 
While these international constraints are real, pro-liber-
alisation forces also have an interest in overstating their 
nature and effect. This process of 'talking up' the constraints 
was exposed recently in relation to APEC. At Osaka in 1995, 
New Zealand ministers and officials described it as their 
mission to 'eliminate the wriggle room' and ensure that 
members could not evade the commitments to trade and 
investment liberalisation made within APEC. That posed a 
dilemma for them in 1996. The main APEC meeting in Ma-
nila took place in November, while there was only a caretaker 
government. A leaked August 1996 draft of the Individual 
Action Plan which New Zealand's representatives in-
tended to table at that meeting showed commitments on 
privatisation, foreign investment and deregulation which 
conflicted with the pre-election promises of New Zealand 
First. A remarkable turnaround then took place. The pre-
viously maligned 'wriggle-room' re-emerged, with 
National's caretaker ministers insisting that APEC was 
only morally binding and that future governments could 
alter those commitments if they wanted to. The economic 
and diplomatic consequences of doing so - the practical 
autonomy of the state- were not, however, addressed. 
Beyond these international agreements lie more subtle 
ideological influences exerted by the international financial 
institutions (like the IMF, World Bank and ADB), rich coun-
tries' clubs (like the OECD and Group of 7), the credit rating 
firms (especially Moody's and Standard and Poor's), glo-
bally-linked neo-liberal think-tanks (like the World Economic 
Forum and Mont Pelerin Society), transnational account-
ing and consultancy firms (such as Price Water house, CS 
First Boston, Ernst Young) and networks of academics, 
consultants, advisers and officials who cross-fertilise ideas 
and implement their common agenda across the globe. 
These voices of the market, and the interests they serve, 
need to be demystified so that people can weigh up the 
value of what they say about the achievements of neo-
liberal 'orthodoxy' and the impossibility of change. People 
need to know, for example, that the wording of the regu-
lar OECD reports of the New Zealand economy is 
negotiated bilaterally with the New Zealand government; 
that the credit rating agencies are businesses which serve 
the international investment community who profit from 
these policies; that the World Economic Forum operates 
as a dating agency between its members - the world's 
richest 1,000 companies - and accommodating govern-
ments, and its World Competitiveness Reports hail policies 
which maximise profits for those companies. 
Still missing from this imagery, and much more diffi-
cult to 'map', is the cultural dimension. In arguing the 
case that nationally-focused industrial policy is both fea-
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sible and desirable, former New Zealander Robert Wade 
argues that nationally-specific cultural systems of educa-
tion, finance, and corporate management influence the 
development of technology and entrepreneurship and dif-
ferentiate countries from each other." At the same time, 
as Roland Robertson points out, economic matters, in-
cluding transnational relations, are subject to cultural 
contingencies and cultural coding which do not always 
coincide with national boundaries: 
Cultural pluralism is itself a constitutive feature of the 
contemporary global circumstance and ... conceptions of 
the world-system, including symbolic responses to and 
interpretations of globalization, are themselves important 
factors in determining trajectories of that very process. 16 
While this sort of multi-dimensional mapping exer-
cise is conceptually useful, it also has dangers. Taken 
alone it presents a complex picture of the distribution of 
power which can appear overwhelming, irresistible and 
disempowering. That need not be so. First, it shows that 
while the factors that constrain state autonomy are di-
verse and diffused, the state does still have a role. Despite 
talk by some of a borderless world, states are still the 
primary locus for regulating the activities of capital and 
markets, and social reproduction of labour, education and 
dominant mores. They are also the agencies which enter 
into these international agreements, determine the policy 
and provide the funds for these international organisa-
tions, pass the laws and make the policies that divest 
future governments of power. Despite pressure to further 
erode their authority and autonomy, they will continue to 
play a critical role. Regulation is not like any other prod-
uct, and regulatory markets are not self-executing. Policies 
need to be embraced, and rules implemented, by the gov-
ernments of national states - states which are subject to 
their own domestic constraints and influences, some of 
which will concur and other of which will resist the con-
tinue erosion of economic and political controls. In the 
process these governments will act selectively and often 
opportunistically to advance their own political, ideologi-
cal and strategic concerns. So there is still a point to 
mobilisation and to politics directed at the national state. 
Second, it is vital to treat this map as only one static 
representation of a highly contested global dynamic. The 
ascendant era of global capitalism is as much a contested 
terrain as was the colonial and imperial capitalism that it 
builds upon yet supersedes. Both operate through exploi-
tation, dispossession and oppression, and give rise to struggle 
and resistance. For those in the South (both the South in 
the South and in the North) the new distribution of power 
is a variation on the old. Their analyses and strategies for 
liberation build on, supersede and sometimes dispense 
with those of the past. New potential alliances and oppor-
tunities for collaboration emerge in new forums. In some 
of these, the victims of the old imperial globalisation are 
joined by the new victims of neo-imperialism. 
The enormity of finding effective, innovative and 
practical strategies to address these challenges cannot be 
denied. But such alliances can be build in New Zealand, 
provided that we, as Tauiwi: 
1. can turn our backs on the self-interested racism of the 
past and see Maori nationalists as allies; 
2. move beyond the paralysis of the past 12 years by 
recognising the manufactured and disempowering ef-
fects of 'TINAism' (there is no alternative); 
3. demystify those agencies, institutions and activities 
through which global forces are represented so we can 
understand how, why and to what extend they effect 
what the state can do; 
4. identify how much room there is to move and how to 
prevent that being further eroded; 
5. articulate a range of alternatives which might improve 
the quality of life for the mass of people, rather than the 
elite, and assess the costs and benefits of pursing those 
options; and 
6. develop strategies to implement those alternatives in 
diverse arenas in the most effective ways. 
My new book, Islands of the Future: Globalisation, Sover-
eignty and Identity in Aotearoa/New Zealand will, I hope, 
open the door to these possibilities. 
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